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2It is generally believed that the engineering works of the Sanitary District of Chicago reversed the Chicago River. In fact, the Sanitary District ensured this reversal under normal operating conditions. 3The Sanitary District was a single-purpose special district, the most common governmental approach to metropolitan problems; see George F. Break, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. 174-75.
4A supragovernmental body was necessary because Chicago's water disposal affected areas far beyond its boundaries. Sewage handling involves two tasks, collection and disposal. Collection is usually accomplished by gravitation, and natural drainage areas do not conform to political boundaries. The externalities implicit in sewage disposal and the scale economies in most collection and disposal technologies also argue for area-wide government control. The Enabling Act itself authorized the creation of sanitary districts: "whenever any area of contiguous territory within the limits of a single county shall contain two or more cities, towns or villages, and shall be so situated that the maintenance of a common outlet for the drainage thereof will conduce to the preservation of the public health" ( SSince Lake Michigan provided Chicago with a low-cost water supply, and since Chicago had installed a sewage collection system, the District's charge was to select the sewage disposal technique which simultaneously maintained the lake's purity and the city of Saint Louis. As a consequence, Chicago's water pollution program came to be determined largely by forces from without, forces which had little interest in pollution control. When completed, the Main Channel had a capacity of 10,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), with a current of less than 2 mph. It was discovered, after the channel was opened, that the actual capacity in the southern section was 40 percent greater than had been anticipated.6 A flow of 10,000 cfs was considered to be the Chicago River's maximum runoff, and, therefore, the Main Channel was constructed to handle this volume. This was necessary to prevent the Chicago River from emptying into the Lake Michigan water supply. The engineers who designed the channel believed that no restriction existed on the minimized total social cost, the value of the best alternative resource utilization available to a society as evaluated by that society. Social cost is distinguished from private cost, which is the value of the best alternative resource utilization available to a producer as evaluated by the producing firm; see, for example, R. G. Lipsey and P. 0. Steiner, Economics, 3d ed. (New York, 1972), pp. 221-29.
I
6Sanitary District of Chicago, "Memorandum concerning the Drainage and Sewage Conditions in Chicago," December 1923, p. 37. While the Sanitary District initially described the excess capacity as having been accidental, they later claimed that this was the designed capacity and that the southern section's capacity was to have been increased to 14,000 cfs when Chicago's population warranted this increase. oPl maximum quantity of water which could be diverted from Lake Michigan. Consequently, they chose to build a channel which would have a 10,000-cfs capacity. It was not their intention that the Main Channel would maintain such a flow rate at all times; they designed a channel which would comply with the Enabling Act's requirement that there be a minimum flow of 3/3 cfs per 1,000 population.7
The Main Channel could not operate properly, however, unless improvements were made in the Chicago River. The Enabling Act made allowances for this contingency. The Chicago River was only 17 feet deep in spite of having been dredged on numerous occasions, and it was less than 100 feet wide in several places. The river had to be enlarged if water was to pass between Lake Michigan and the Main Channel without creating a current obstructive to Chicago River navigation. As such, the Chicago River project was included in the District's plans from the outset.
II
In June 1896, the Sanitary District wrote the secretary of war requesting a permit to proceed with the proposed Chicago River improvements. With this request, the District enclosed full information and maps. Since the Chicago River was designated a federal harbor, the District had to obtain a federal permit for the necessary river improvements. The U.S. chief of engineers commented:
As far as the work itself is concerned there can be no objection to it, as in every case the navigation channel of the Chicago River will be improved. ... I am unable to do otherwise than to recommend the granting of the authority sought.
The question that must come up later for the action of the War Department, to wit: Whether the improved channel of the Chicago River will be sufficient to carry 300,000 cubic feet of water per minute without lessening or destroying the navigability of the Chicago River or whether the City of Chicago will be allowed ... to take any water at all from the Great Lakes with the inevitable result of lowering their levels is not now under investigation.... . . . this authority shall not be interpreted as approval of the plans of the Sanitary District of Chicago to introduce a current 7George W. Fuller, "The Sewage Disposal Problem of Chicago" (paper read at the midwinter convocation of the Western Society of Engineers, Chicago, February 19, 1925), p. 4. There were legitimate grounds for the assumption that no restrictions would be placed on the diversion of Lake Michigan water. The assumption was predicated on the belief that, as the new Main Channel was a substitute for the old Illinois and Michigan Canal, it had all the rights granted to its predecessor. into [the] Chicago River. This latter proposition must be hereafter submitted for consideration.8 A volume of 300,000 cfm (5,000 cfs) was to be the initial diversion. It would be expanded to a maximum of 10,000 cfs with increased demands on the Main Channel. The chief of engineers authorized the river improvements while simultaneously questioning the reason for the improvements.
In May 1895, a federal commission was appointed to investigate the Main Channel's effect on lake and harbor levels, a question raised by the chief of engineers, among others. Their report, in October 1895, indicated that the proposed diversion would lower the level of the Great Lakes by about 6 inches.9 The secretary of war, the chief of engineers, and the Congress were all advised by this commission's report of the diversion's possible effect on lake and harbor navigation.
On In approving the construction of the Main Channel, the Illinois General Assembly required a 3/3-cfs diversion for each 1,000 tributary population equivalent. The channel's designed 10,000-cfs capacity could handle a 3/3 million tributary population equivalent.12 The smaller diversion permitted by the War Department reduced the sewage capacity which the channel could handle and, therefore, increased per unit costs. Consequently, the Sanitary District considered the 10,000-cfs diversion a necessity. However, requests were denied for enlarging the federally permitted diversion after the completion of the river improvements, and the secretary of war undertook legal action in 1908 and 1912 to prohibit any total diversion greater than that specified by the War Department permit.13
The change in the War Department's emphasis from regulating only the flow through the Chicago River to regulating the total Lake Michigan diversion was influenced, undoubtedly, by the fact that sevlThe Sanitary District later argued that "had there been no current created and had the Chicago River Channel been as wide and as deep as it was later created, there would have been no modification of the withdrawal" ("Memorandum concerning the Drainage and Sewage Conditions in Chicago," p. 37).
12"Population equivalent" is the total human population plus the population that would be necessary to produce domestic wastes equivalent to the area's industrial wastes. The 20,000-cfm provision in the state law appears to be based more on expediency than on any definite knowledge. The Chicago Drainage and Water Supply Commission withheld its opinion on the proper dilution until it could complete additional tests. open its completed channel before Saint Louis could undertake any action. Consequently, water was pumped into the Main Channel on the same day Governor Tanner authorized the opening after receiving the commissioner's report that the channel was ready. There was no formal ceremony. The opening was kept quiet, for the District feared that any prior notice might hasten Saint Louis's attempt to get a federal injunction. The opening of the Lockport dam, the Main Channel's southern end, on January 17, 1900, was a more formal occasion, but nonetheless hasty. Saint Louis was aware of the channel's construction but procrastinated seeking an injunction until the last possible moment. While the Sanitary District did avoid an injunction, it still had to answer Saint Louis's objections in court.
In 1902, Professor Arthur W. Palmer, of the University of Illinois Chemistry Department, issued a report of his study made to determine the effect of flow in the Main Channel on the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers. The Illinois River oxidized the sewage as it flowed toward the Mississippi. In fact, the Illinois was clean by the time it reached Peoria and Pekin, where it was befouled once again by slaughterhouse and distillery wastes. It was these wastes, and not Chicago's, which were the principal polluters of the lower Illinois River. By the time the river reached the Mississippi River, the water was clean once again: "little more than a harmless salt remained to tell of the enormous pollution 320 miles above."16 The water's physical appearance and the presence of a fishing industry also testified to the river's improvement.
There can be little doubt that Palmer's investigation was carried out in an unprejudiced manner, in spite of the fact that its purpose was to support the hypothesis that Chicago's sewage was not polluting the Saint Louis water supply after all. By 1909, the District began to make moves in the direction of waste treatment in the realization that the area it served had mushroomed and that they might lose the court cases.35 It is in this latter sense that the federal government's "sewage control program" helped induce technological change. Testing stations had been built to study various treatment methods for domestic sewage and for packinghouse, tannery, and corn products wastes. By 1922, the District had planned and was constructing sewage treatment plants.36 Unquestionably, the 31Ibid., p. 237. 32Pearse ("Chicago's Quest for Potable Water," p. 4) estimated that, if the federal government's position was upheld in court, an additional expenditure of approximately $100 million would have been required (over the next 10 years) to reach a point with another technology which, with dilution, they already enjoyed. Including the additional operating costs, the total damages were estimated to be over $200 million. Total damages were the sum of total expenditures, past, present, and future, plus operating costs. 33Randolph, p. 237. the Main Channel's maximum tributary population equivalent would soon be reached, and sewage treatment was contemplated to supplement dilution. The first 3/3 million population equivalent was to be handled by dilution, and the remainder was to be handled by sewage treatment. What the order accomplished was to reverse these priorities: treatment handled the initial sewage collection while dilution handled the untreated effluent. The transition was smooth. A large part of the $125 million which the Sanitary District had expended on the dilution method was incorporated, at least partially, into the revised approach. The introduction of sewage treatment as a supplement to dilution was accomplished while the District was testing alternative treatment methods. The ascendancy of sewage treatment was one which required only minor adjustments in projected plants and resulted in relatively minor losses at existing sewage treatment installations. Clearly, the District was ready for almost any contingency which the Supreme Court decision might have created, and it appeared to have achieved this preparedness at minimum cost.42
From an economic point of view, the Sanitary District's conservative approach to technological change had paid off. By waiting as long as it did, the District was able to make its investment in the activatedsludge method, the one it considered most efficient and economical.43 Two important problems remained. First, this did not eliminate the lake-level controversy. Court proceedings on the question of Chicago's diversion were ongoing in the late 1960s, and the Sanitary District in 1974 is making plans for complete sewage treatment in the event of a further reduction. Since the channel system is still used as the repository of the treated effluent and as an overflow, it is necessary for some diversion to provide a current. Curiously, the pollution issue is not particularly prominent in the discussion of complete treatment, nor is cost. The dominant theme continues to be the effect on lake levels. Second, the pollution problem has not been entirely solved. A reduced diversion accompanied by a corresponding reduction in raw 44The printed record does not afforl sufficient grounds to select among these alternative hypotheses. sewage, the treated-sewage equivalent, means fewer pollutants oxidized less quickly. Thus, the continued increase in the tributary population equivalent has increased the problem. Fortunately, the Sanitary District's method normally keeps these pollutants from befouling the Lake Michigan water supply. The District is legally constrained to Cook County and its roughly 5 million inhabitants ( 
